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G3 AGREEMENT: A COMPARISON OF ITS
INVESTMENT CHAPTER WITH THE
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar*
I. INTRODUCTIONA sLatin America and the Caribbean are involved in discussions
for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, it is useful to highlight
the merits of interregional agreements that are already in place
within the Americas. This article looks at the components of the invest-
ment chapter of the free trade agreement between Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela, commonly known as the Group of Three Agreement or the
G3 Agreement (G3 or G3 Agreement).
In 1994, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela completed negotiations on a
free trade area agreement. The conclusion of the negotiations was for-
malized in an agreement, which was then approved by each country as
internal law.' While the agreement is largely focused on trade matters,
other economic topics are also included. One such topic is investment.
*Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar is a member of the panel of arbitrators of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) and the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO) and is listed as an arbitrator with the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). He is an international consultant in
public policy. He is President of BG Consulting, Inc., a consulting firm based in
Washington, D.C., specializing in development policies, business development and
investment disputes. He is admitted to practice law in Venezuela, New York,
Washington, D.C, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. He is a graduate of
Universidad Cat6lica Andr6s Bello, Caracas, Venezuela (Abogado, cum laude,
1987), with post-graduate studies in Political Science, Universidad Sim6n Bolivar,
Caracas, Venezuela 1989; LL.M, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
1992; and M.Phil and Ph.D. studies in Law and Foreign Investment, University of
Edinburgh, United Kingdom 1997 as a Chevening scholar. He served as a Profes-
sor at Universidad Cat6lica Andrds Bello, in Caracas, Venezuela, Universidad
Central de Venezuela, and Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administraci6n
(IESA), Caracas, Venezuela. He is an associate editor of Transnational Dispute
Management and is listed in the Marquis Who's Who in American Law, 2005. The
author can be contacted at omargarcia@bg-consulting.com. The opinions ex-
pressed here are personal and do not reflect the view of the organizations to which
he is affiliated.
1. See Tratado de Libre Comercio, Colom.-Mex.-Venez., June 13, 1994, available at
http://www.iadb.org/intal/tratados/g3.htm (last visited July 14, 2004) [hereinafter
G3 Agreement].
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Chapter seventeen of the G3 deals with investment matters, including
its definitions, treatment, transfers, expropriations, performance require-
ments, safeguard mechanisms for payment balance troubles, and invest-
ment disputes.
This article highlights the main aspects of the emerging international
law of foreign investment 2 in relation to these issues and describes the G3
approach. For analysis purposes, this approach is compared to the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFA).3
The interpretation of NAFTA and the decisions of tribunals applying it
are particularly relevant, at least to investors from the two G3 parties
investing in Mexico, for several reasons: NAFTFA contains a chapter on
investment, Mexico is party to both agreements, and the G3 Agreement
has a specific provision related to most favored nation treatment.
Likewise, the Cartagena Agreement, which launched the Andean
Community, to which Venezuela and Colombia are party, is reviewed.
The Cartagena Agreement and particularly Decision 291 of the Commis-
sion, which relates to the framework for the Common Treatment of For-
eign Capital and Trademarks, Patents, Licensing Agreements, and
Royalties, might be extended to Mexican investments and Mexican inves-
tors in the other two G3 parties via the most favored nation treatment. 4
The rationale for including an investment chapter in the G3 was to pro-
mote investments through investment protection. By granting legal cer-
tainty to investors and investments from one party into the territory of
another party, it was thought that investments would be more likely to
flow therein.
After almost ten years, this has been the balance of chapter seventeen
of the G3 on pursuing that objective: outflow investments from Mexico in
Colombia and Venezuela have totaled $3,197.8 million. Of that amount
50.3 percent is attributable to investments made in Colombia, and 49.7
percent is attributable to investments made in Venezuela. 5 Investments
from Colombia and Venezuela to Mexico from January 1994 to June 2001
were registered for the amount of $42.6 million. Colombian investors in-
vested $17.9 million, whereas Venezuelan investors invested $24.7 mil-
2. Emerging international law of foreign investment is understood as those common
principles arising out of bilateral and multilateral agreements on foreign invest-
ment and of non-binding international instruments.
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [here-
inafter NAFTA].
4. See Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena Agreement), May 2,
1969, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/trea/ande-trie1.
htm (last visited July 4, 2004). See also, Decision 291: Regime for the Common
Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents, Licensing Agreements, and
Royalties, Mar. 21, 1991, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treat
ies/dec/d291e.htm (last visited July 4, 2004).
5. Mexican companies such as CEMEX, HYLSA, TELMEX, TAMSA and Grupo
Maseca, were the major investors.
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lion, primarily in the area of services. 6 Investment inflows to Venezuela
from Colombia during the period 1998-2002 totaled $204 million, whereas
investments from Mexico during the same period totaled $17 million.7
During the period from 1994-2002, Colombia received investments from
Mexico in the amount of $67.5 million. It also received $393.9 million
from Andean countries, including Venezuela. 8
II. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT
A. INVESTMENT ACCORDING TO THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
There are different kinds of Foreign Investment (FI). One of them is
foreign direct investment (FDI),9 understood as the permanent establish-
ment of a business in a foreign jurisdiction in order to reduce transactions
costs.' 0 For that establishment, generally, a cross-borders transfer of cap-
ital is made in kind or through funds."1 FDI differs from other kinds of
business in that the investor assumes both the risk of the operation and its
control. However, most international transfers of capital are not FDI.
The second type of F1 is portfolio investments (PI), 12 which do not pur-
6. See G3, Informacion General del Tratado de Libre Comercio del Grupo de los Tres,
http://g3.minrelext.gov.co/g3/webdriver.exe?Mlval=librecomercio-generalidades.
html (last visited July 12, 2004).
7. See Venezuela Council for Investment Protection, Nuevas inversions extranjeras
por pias de origen, available at http://www.conapriorg/framedetalle.asp?sec=1102
&id=51&plantilla=9 (last visited July 4, 2004).
8. See Banco de la Republica, FluiD Neto de Inversion Extranjera Directa en Colom-
bia Segiin la Balanza de Pago, available at http://www.banrep.org/economia/flujo
siepais.pdf (last visited July 12, 2004).
9. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
1996, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at 3,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD(DTCI/32, U.N. Sales No. E.96.tI.A.14 (1996).
10. See SANJAYA LALL & PAUL STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONALS
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (1977) (explaining that although some other rea-
sons are indicated for FDI, the most common is profit-seeking, but not the intent
to function as instruments of imperialism. It is so because the investor entities are
not political-purpose organizations, but rather means of business).
11. See GASTON GAUDARD, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL EC-
ONOMIC ORDER 33 (Detlev Dicke ed., 1987) (arguing that there could be foreign
investments without real transfer of capital. This occurs either through service
contracts, or reinvestment, or local financing or by deconcentration of any of the
subsidiaries. Furthermore, when the subsidiaries invest themselves, they are en-
gaging in foreign investment, economically speaking, without transferring any cap-
ital). See also EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, THE SURGE IN
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 80s, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 15
(Kenneth Froot ed., 1993 ) (explaining that Foreign Investment can be done with-
out inflow of capital, such as borrowing money to buy shares or through share
swapping).
12. See CANADA PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE
OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF
CANADIAN INDUSTRY JANUARY 1968 24 (1968). See also MILTIADES
CHACHOLIADES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 268 (1990) (explaining that portfo-
lio investment refers to purchases of foreign securities (bonds and stocks) that do
not carry any claim on control or ownership of foreign enterprises).
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sue the exchange of goods as in trade, but pursue profits on a speculative
basis through buy and sell operations in the stock market. The investor in
this kind of FI does not seek operational control of the business but holds
stock in anticipation of its appreciation. 13
UNCTAD differentiates between these first two types of foreign in-
vestment by looking at the investor's role in asserting management con-
trol over assets in the following passage:
In conceptual terms, FDI and foreign portfolio investment are distinct.
Direct investment involves both a long-term interest in, and significant
management influence over, a foreign affiliate. Portfolio investment may
include a long-term interest, but it seldom involves managerial control.
For statistical purposes, a threshold of 10% of share ownership has been
established to differentiate equity holdings of direct and portfolio inves-
tors. But in practice, the line between different types of investment is
sometimes difficult to draw. In some circumstances, foreign investors
may use their assets as collateral to borrow from local capital markets
and use the proceeds for hedging or speculation. Conversely, venture
capitalists can take a significant management interest in a venture with-
out a large shareholding -and their activity, conventionally defined as
portfolio investment, is similar to direct investment . ... 14
There are also new forms of F1 in which the investor enters a country
and markets a product or service but does not own the asset. These new
forms of FL are found in license agreements, management contracts, joint
venture agreements, service agreements, and production sharing agree-
ments in which there is a transfer of capital but no establishment of an
entity, nor is the transaction executed through the stock exchange.' 5
In each kind of Fl, the benefit for the receiving country is the same:
incoming capital that can finance development and stimulate growth.16
13. CHACHOLIADES, supra note 12, at 268.
14. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 2003, FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES at 100, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/NIR/2003, U.N. Sales No.
E.03.11.08 (2003) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND Dp-
VELORMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003].
15. CHARLES P. OMAN, NEW FORMS OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, IN-
VESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? 131 (Theodore
H. Moran ed., 1986) (explaining that "[tihe term 'new forms of investment' (NFI)
covers a broad, heterogeneous range of international business operations that all
have a common denominator: For an investment project in a host country, a for-
eign company supplies goods, either tangible or intangible, which constitute assets,
but it does not own the project itself ... the foreign partner's equity share, if any,
does not constitute ownership control . . . this does not mean that the foreign
company cannot exercise partial or total control over the project by other
means").
16. The investment in the host country can activate production machinery, which
probably would not otherwise have been activated. For example, the use of local
financing would generate competition and the rising of new entities within the fi-
nancial sector. One single entity would not suffice for the needs of the corpora-
tion. The outcome is that the development process of the country is accelerated.
In this way, the host country can become an economic power that challenges the
strength of the home country. See THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, DISTORTION OR DE-
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Thus, although FDI is seen as the most beneficial of FL for its positive
externalities,' 7 other forms of FI can also bring the money that develop-
ing countries so desperately need without some of the disadvantages that
are linked to FDI. For instance, the host country's fear of losing control
over important sectors of its economy does not surface when investors
lack managerial control as in PI. 18
If protection is granted only to one kind of FI, it is not only the investor
who would be in peril; countries would also lose a source of capital. For
example, in economic reform cases, liberalization of only one kind of FI
has made the country's economy vulnerable to the dangers associated
with that particular kind of FI. 19
Moreover, there are grey area cases in which it is not clear whether FL
is direct or portfolio. Such cases occur when the FL concerns the acquisi-
tion of the shares of a corporation which are bought in the stock ex-
change market, that is, take over. 20 It may also occur when there is an
acquisition of securities guaranteed with collateral in assets of the enter-
prise, which have been issued by a corporation, for purposes of financing
VELOPMENT? CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TION 9 (1978).
17. See ALAN GILPIN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS 84 (4th ed. 1977).
"[E]xternal effects or externalities" are "costs and benefits caused by the activities
of an industry which are not reflected in the price at which the product is sold or
influence the quantities purchased; costs not borne by those who occasion them,
and benefits not paid for by the recipients." Accordingly, positive externalities are
the beneficial side effects of an economic activity, such as those that activate the
economy and do not harm anyone.
18. See IBRAHIM SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ORIGINS, OPERATIONS,
POLICIES AND BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT GUAR-
ANTEE AGENCY 4 (1988).
19. The Mexican financial crisis of the 1990s was caused, to a large extent, by the
extreme protection PI received as opposed to FDI. Accordingly, PI could move a
huge amount of capital in a short time because they did not have any sunken costs.
That is exactly what happened when the political crisis exploded. Had there been
the same treatment for all FI, Mexico could possibly have been in better shape to
assimilate the impact of fleeing capital. See Stephen Fidler, That Sinking Feeling,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at 12.
20. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf. "A foreign direct inves-
tor is an individual, an incorporated or unincorporated public or private
enterprise, a government, a group related individuals, or a group of related incor-
porated and/or unincorporated enterprises which has a direct investment enter-
prise-that is, a subsidiary, associated or branch-operating in a country other
than the country or countries of residence of the foreign direct investment investor
or investors." Id. at 1 6. It is important to point out that the document does not
use the term "corporation" but "enterprise," which seems not to be a legal term.
Some definition of "enterprise" is provided by the same source as "an incorpo-
rated or unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or
more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the
equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise. The numerical guideline of ownership
of 10 per cent of ordinary shares or voting stock determines the existence of a
direct investment relationship. An effective voice in the management, as evi-
denced by an ownership of at least 10 per cent, implies that the direct investor is
able to influence or participate in the management of an enterprise; it does not
require absolute control by the foreign investor." Id. at 7-8.
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a particular operation. In the latter case, the buyer has control of the
enterprise through the guarantee and would not be happy to hear that the
investment would not be protected.
In the same sense, some existing non-comprehensive legal instruments
on F1 cover both FDI and PI. That is the case of the convention of the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),21 which includes as
eligible investments, not only equity interests, but also medium and long-
term loans made or guaranteed by holders of equity in the enterprise.
The MIGA Convention also covers the reinvestment of profits and any
transfer of foreign exchange related to the existing investment. Likewise,
it extends eligibility to investments different from those listed there.
However, in the case of loans different from those previously mentioned,
they have to be related to a specific investment covered in order to be
guaranteed by MIGA.22
In addition, the convention of the International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)23 does not even define F1, thus it could
be used to settle any kind of F1 disputes, not only FDI disputes. Moreo-
ver, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 24 have defined F1 in very broad
terms. They cover FDI, the establishment of a new corporation, the ac-
quisition of a facility, and operations through a branch. But they also
cover PI, such as acquisition of bonds or stocks in the public market, as
well as the new forms of FI, e.g., management and service contracts, li-
cense agreements, etc. 25 When these treaties provide a list of investments
protected, it is done only for illustrative purposes since special mention is
made that the list is non-exhaustive. Some BITs even provide protection
21. Convention Establishing the Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11,
1985, 24 I.L.M. 1605 [hereinafter MIGA].
22. Id. at art. 12. See also SHIHATA, supra note 18, at 112. Unlike most national invest-
ment guarantee programs, coverage will also extend to portfolio investment, in-
cluding minority participation in joint ventures, preferred stock and shares
resulting from the conversion of debt instruments. Among portfolio investments,
preference will be given to those associated with foreign direct investments in the
same enterprise.
23. Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Sept. 10, 1964, 1 U.S.T. 1270, 4 I.L.M. 524.
24. See UNITED NATIONS CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES at 16-29, U.N. Doc.ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.11.A.1(1988). Accordingly, some treaties have a broad definition of invest-
ment comprising capital transfer, reinvcstment and entities. New forms of co-op-
eration such as management, marketing or turnkey contracts are covered.
Portfolio investments are mentioned in some.
25. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES, POLICY
AND PRACTICE 45 (1992) (explaining that the US BIT Model draft of 1983 defined
investment as "every kind of investment ... owned or controlled directly or indi-
rectly by nationals ... of the other party"). See also Adeoye Akinsanya, Interna-
tional Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third World, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 58 (1987) (explaining that the Swiss agreement on the reciprocal pro-
motion and protection of investments with other Less Developed Countries de-
fines investment in broad terms. It covers FDI and PI, but also intellectual
property rights and concessions).
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to investment associated activities.26
The bulk of evidence shows that it is necessary to balance the needs of
investors and recipient countries in order to develop an appropriate legal
framework for FI. Exclusion of PI in the definition of FI should be re-
considered, as any type of foreign capital inflow provides the host country
with needed capital. 27
B. INVESTMENT ACCORDING TO THE G3
The G3 leans favorably to protect FDI, but it also provides protection
for other forms of Fl. It has done so by taking an enterprise-based ap-
proach to define investment. At first sight, the G3's method seems some-
what restrictive by only including FDI in the form of an enterprise, that
is, a business organization that may or may not be incorporated. But the
03's definition also seems to include stock ownership (if the enterprise is
incorporated) and investment in intellectual property rights, including
franchise granting.2 8
The G3 also incorporates different kinds of FI as accepted by the mu-
nicipal laws of the parties. However, it expressly excludes credit or loan
operations, such as State indebtedness. The G3 also excludes monetary
rights that arise exclusively from commercial transactions for the sale of
goods or services that do not entail a commercial presence of the investor
in the other party. Likewise, it excludes trade-financing transactions. 29
The G3's use of an enterprise-based definition is a positive one. By
defining investment in terms of enterprise, the G3 grants protection to
non-incorporated forms of FT as well as incorporated forms. The term
"enterprise" is more general than the term "corporation," but the former
comprises the latter. The drafters of the G3 differentiated between con-
stituting an enterprise and organizing an enterprise. The agreement
states that an enterprise will be any entity constituted, organized or pro-
tected under domestic laws. Such a provision opens the door for protec-
tion of non-incorporated forms of business organizations.
Enterprise is an economic term, not a legal term, related to the organi-
zation and integration of the business rather than its legal form. In addi-
tion, an enterprise does not necessarily have legal personality. An
enterprise may take different legal forms30 such as a corporation, a facil-
26. Id. at app. A-4. The U.S. 1987 draft defines "associated activities" as including
"the organization, control, operation, maintenance and dispositions of companies,
branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities for the conduct of business;
the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, use, pro-
tection and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual and industrial
property rights; and the borrowing of funds, the purchase and issuance of equity
shares, and the purchase of foreign exchange for imports." Id.
27. See SHIHATA, supra note 18, at 4 (arguing that portfolio is a means of capital con-
centration without the risk of control of the entity, nor of the country's economy).
28. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-01.
29. Id.
30. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 201(1), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). "[E]nterprise means any entity constituted or organ-
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ity, or an arrangement arising out of a contract.
The term "enterprise" could be used to refer to the investment but not
to the investor. The G3 also uses "enterprise," inter alia, to define "inves-
tor." However, an "enterprise" could never be held liable. Legally
speaking, the liability of an enterprise's actions would fall on the investor.
Moreover, the G3 defines investment as the transfer of resources from
one party to another party. The agreement does not make reference to
transfer of capital. The term "resources" is left undefined but is more
comprehensive than capital.
The agreement also incorporates within its definition of investment any
other resource considered as investment under local laws. Such inclusion
may provide clearer criteria for determining what F is31 and may eventu-
ally expand the applicability of the agreement to other kinds of
investment.
However, the G3 Agreement excludes all kinds of credit operations,
particularly those involving the State or its enterprises. This approach
seems to be intended to exclude PI, perhaps for its perceived danger with
regards the balance of payments of countries. Thus, the incorporation of
a local laws definition of FI cannot repeal the express provisions of the
agreement, particularly those related to exclusion of specific types of
investment.
Reading the G3 definition of investment, it can be concluded that only
PI related to credit, such as bonds, are excluded. Portfolio investment in
the equity of a locally incorporated entity will be protected.
"Article 17-01: Definitions
For purposes of this chapter, it will be understood that:
Enterprise is: any entity constituted, organized or protected in accor-
dance with the law in force, either for profit or not and either of
private property or governmental, including corporations, founda-
tions, companies, branches, trusts, stocks, solely owned enterprises,
shared investments or any other association;
Investment is: the resources transferred to the national territory of a
Party or reinvested therein by investors of the other Party, including:
* any kind of good or right with the purpose of producing economic
benefit;
ized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately-owned
or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole pro-
prietorship, joint venture or other association." Id.
31. That is the case of the Venezuelan investment law which provides that rent-pro-
ducing assets, either under incorporated or contractual forms, real estate, govern-
mental concessions related to natural resources or public services and commercial
instruments are considered investments. See Venezuelan Law for Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Decreto No. 356, de octubre de 3 de 1999, GACETA
OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA 5390 de 22.10.1999, at art 3. See also Colombian Stat-
ute of Foreign Investment, Consejo National de Planificacion Economica Social
(CONPES) Res. No. 51 of 1991, at art. 4 (defining F1 as FDI and as PI).
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* the participation of investors of a party, in any proportion, in the
capital equity of the corporations constituted or organized in accor-
dance with the law of the other Party;
" the enterprises owned by an investor of that Party or effectively con-
trolled by him, that have been constituted or organized in the terri-
tory of the other Party; and
" any other resource considered as investment under the law of that
Party.
Investment does not include credit of debt operations, among them:
" a payment obligation by the State or a State enterprise or the credit
granting to the State or to a State enterprise;
* monetary rights derived exclusively out of:
* commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national
or an enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the
territory of other Party; or
" credit granting in relation with a commercial transaction, such as
trade financing. '32
The exclusion of credit operations certainly narrows the scope of appli-
cability of chapter seventeen of the G3, particularly when it relates to
State credit transactions. As the FEDAX case shows, investors might
take the risk of acquiring credit bonds issued by States. The knowledge
that such acquisitions will be protected by international law instruments
might make those instruments more appealing to investors within the
global market. At the end of the day, investors invest if they find an
opportunity for a satisfactory return at an acceptable level of risk,33 and
having protection under international law for a given transaction dimin-
ishes risk.
In FEDAX, a company established in the Netherlands Antilles submit-
ted to the Tribunal a dispute against Venezuela concerning debt instru-
ments issued by Venezuela and assigned to the company by way of
endorsement. The Tribunal held that non-direct FI could have interna-
tional protection, that what mattered most was that the whole operation
could be qualified as an investment (even if it was not FDI), and the
dispute arose directly out of that operation through the particular
transaction. 34
Had the G3 been the applicable law in the FEDAX case, the investor
would not have been protected. Lack of legal coverage might have influ-
enced the investor's initial decision to invest, and the State could have
missed an important source of financing.
32. G3 Agreement, supra note 1 (translation by author).
33. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in Developing Coun-
tries, 15 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 386 (1998).
34. FEDAX N.V. v. Venez., 37 I.L.M. 1378 at 24 (1998) (Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction).
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III. TREATMENT
A. TREATMENT ACCORDING TO THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Once an investor is established in the host country, how should its op-
erations be treated? In the past, it was thought that investors should be
entitled to better treatment than local investors because the treatment
granted to the latter might be below the internationally accepted mini-
mum requirements. 35 The principle of sovereignty ensures the right of
host countries to regulate economic activities in their territories, which
meant that investors were treated in the same manner that national inves-
tors were treated, or possibly worse. Likewise, home countries were
asked to accept the right of the host country to regulate economic activi-
ties operating within their territories, even if citizens of the former were
performing those activities. 36
Probably the most illustrative example of this controversy is the Calvo
doctrine and the Calvo clause, 37 under which investors were asked to ex-
haust the local legal remedies and surrender their right to request diplo-
matic protection to their home countries respectively. Under the Calvo
doctrine, aliens were deprived of any protection. Aliens had to insist on
treatment that met minimum standards.38 However, there was no defini-
tion of what minimum standards meant.
The common standards of treatment that have been emerging in the
international law of foreign investments are: national treatment, most fa-
vored nation (MFN) treatment, and fair and equitable treatment. Na-
tional treatment subjects investors to domestic regulations in the same
terms nationals are. If the national treatment standard is applied, a coun-
try has a right to regulate through national laws provided it does not in-
troduce a distinction on the basis of nationality.
MFN treatment provides that foreign investors should receive the same
treatment other foreigners receive if it is more favorable. This prohibits
35. See BURNS H. WESTON, THE NFW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE
DEPRIVATION OF FOREIGN PROPRIETARY WEALTH: SOME REFLECTIONS UPON
THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW DEBATE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY To ALIENS, 89-125 (Richard. B. Lillich ed.,
1983).
36. C. Fred Bergsten & Edward M. Graham, Needed: New International Rules for For-
eign Investment, 7 INT'L TRADE J. 15-41 (1992).
37. Named after the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Calvo. As per this
doctrine, investors were subject to the same treatment domestic investors receive
in the host country, not better. Only after exhausting local legal remedies could
they claim diplomatic protection in few restricted cases. Likewise, host countries
argued that they were not obliged to indemnify aliens for losses that were not the
State's fault. Thus, foreign countries should restrain from making claims on those
bases. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (6th ed. 1991). See also Greta Gainer,
Nationalization: The Dichotomy between Western and Third World Perspectives in
International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 (1983); Tim Gebert, The Principles of Just
Compensation for International Takings, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 389 (1995).
38. The most common minimum standards are the right of due process and the right to
own property.
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discrimination between foreign investors but does not grant a treatment
equal to that given to the host country's entities or investors. Moreover,
all foreigners could be treated below certain minimum standards, making
the MFN treatment less useful.
Likewise, fair and equitable3 9 treatment in the host country might not
be of any help if it is not well-defined or if it is not provided along with
other standards or with international minimum standards. For this rea-
son, the emerging international law of foreign investment provides that
foreign investors be granted a combination of all the preceding standards
of treatment.
B. TREATMENT ACCORDING TO THE G3
The G3 provides for national treatment and MFN treatment. No spe-
cific provision of admission or pre-establishment treatment is included.
An argument can be made in favor of extending the national and the
MFN treatment for admission of investment. However, the G3 Agree-
ment states that the standards are applicable to both investors and invest-
ments. Neither the investments nor investors exist before the capital has
been transferred into the host State. Thus, the standards of treatment
provided by the G3 are only applicable once the investment has been
made, that is, post-establishment.
Hence, the parties retain the absolute right to control the admission
and establishment of investors in their respective territories. Because the
parties to the G3 have not agreed on any standard for treatment at the
pre-establishment stage, international law does not have a say regarding a
State's decision on whether to admit an investment or investor. That de-
cision remains an act of sovereignty governed by municipal laws.
Article 17-06 of the G3 Agreement provides for the possibility of State
parties making reservations to the agreement. However, those reserva-
tions are not intended to apply to sectors of the economy where F1 will
not be admitted but rather to sectors of the economy where certain provi-
sions of treatment post-establishment will be applied differently.40
After establishment, each party shall grant to the other parties' inves-
tors and investments treatment that is no less favorable than treatment to
local investors and investments in similar circumstances. 4 1 There is no
definition of the term "similar circumstances." Thus, it remains an issue
that needs to be determined case-by-case. The reference to "no-less-
favorable" standards might ably protect foreign investors when treatment
provided to domestic investors falls below certain international minimum
standards. In those cases, the foreign investor may be treated more
favorably. 42
39. See P.T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 504 (1995).
40. G3 Agreement, supra note 1.
41. Id. at art. 17-03 (1).
42. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003, FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 108.
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The G3 Agreement has no provision of fair and equitable treatment or
minimum international standards. However, the local investment law of
Venezuela so provides. This means that fair and equitable treatment
along with the other standards of treatment provided by the G3 could be
applicable to investors from the other parties when doing business in the
territory of that party. 43
The agreement also provides for MFN treatment in circumstances simi-
lar to investments and investors of the other parties. However, the agree-
ment expressly excludes MFN treatment from the definitions and from
the double taxation treaties. Thus, the type of FT excluded in the defini-
tion could not be incorporated through application of the MFN standard
of treatment.
MFN treatment in the G3 brings in provisions of the NAFTA, which
are more favorable than the G3 provisions. They might apply to Colom-
bian and Venezuelan investors and Colombian and Venezuelan invest-
ments in Mexico because the G3 provides MFN standard of treatment,
and Mexico is party to the NAFTA.
The agreement also states that its benefits could be denied to investors
of a party who are controlled by investors of a third party if such a third
party investor does not conduct substantial business in the territory of the
home State party. For that denial to occur, the G3 parties involved need
to consult each other.44
Thus, third country investors willing to benefit from the coverage of the
G3 should be aware that the mere incorporation of an intermediary com-
pany in a G3 party State would not ensure coverage. In' this sense, a
tribunal deciding a case according to the G3 could face the issue of third
State investor control. The tribunal could use the criterion established in
the AMCO case and reach the immediate level of control of the parent
company over a local company. If it determines that the control is held
by a third State investor at that level, the tribunal could refuse to extend
G3 protection.4 5
The hypothetical tribunal could also use the criterion established in the
SOABI case. 46 In that case, the Tribunal went beyond direct control.
SOABI was a Senegalese incorporated company, controlled by a Pana-
manian company, which in turn was controlled by Belgian citizens. Pan-
ama was not a contracting State of the ICSID Convention when
arbitration consent was given, but Belgium was. Senegal objected to ju-
risdiction, arguing that Panama was not part of the ICSID system. Thus,
SOABI could be considered a local company under foreign control, but
the foreigners who controlled SOABI were not nationals of a contracting
43. See Venezuelan Law for Protection and Promotion of Investment, supra note 31,
at art. 6.
44. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at 17-11.
45. AMCO Asia Corp. v. Indon., ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/81/1 (1983), 23 I.L.M. 351
(1984).
46. SOABI v. Sen., ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/82/1, 6 ICSIR Rev. - FOREIGN INv. L.J.
120 (1991).
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State of the Convention and thus could not use ICSID arbitration. The
Tribunal found that the purpose of article 25(2)(b) of the Convention was
to facilitate foreign investments through locally incorporated companies,
in order to qualify before ICSID. As a consequence of this interpreta-
tion, the Tribunal went beyond direct control and found that the Belgian
nationals in effect controlled SOABI. On this basis, the Tribunal rejected
the objection to jurisdiction. If the Tribunal uses the SOABI criterion
and finds that a third party investor controls an entity incorporated in a
G3 Party, it could deny the extension of the benefits of the agreement.
IV. EXPROPRIATION
A. EXPROPRIATION ACCORDING TO THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The right of property is understood as the right to freely use, dispose
and profit from the asset owned. 47 There is not a consensus concerning
the extent upon which the owner can use property vis-A-vis the State.
Thus, the definition of what the right of property for the country and the
limits each can impose over that right are central to the expectations of
the investors.
In that sense, one concern of investors is the possibility of property
deprivation. Although this issue seems to be a matter of the past,48 the
principle of sovereignty has not and will not disappear. It is precisely by
virtue of this principle that countries are empowered to regulate their
economies.
Today, the majority of damage to the property of investors, both local
and foreign, is imposed through regulation. 49 The property is not ex-
pressly taken but rather is left useless by the burden of these regulatory
provisions. In order to avoid this kind of hidden expropriation, most in-
ternational investment agreements establish a limit at which the inves-
tor's right of property is maintained while fostering domestic social
welfare. They also establish that the State, while pursuing its goals, may
impose regulations that temporarily and partially affect the property.50
Nevertheless, such authority is subject to certain requirements that make
it both, stable and predictable. 5 1
47. See generally S.R. MUNZER, A THEORY O1- PROPERTY (1990).
48. See M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 8-20
(1994) (explaining that if the political climate changes, the world could face a new
wave of expropriations).
49. See Robert Shanks, Insuring Investment and Loans Against Currency Inconvertibil-
ity, Expropriation, and Political Violence, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 417
(1986).
50. See Rudolf Doizer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID REV. - FOR-
EIUN INV. L. 41 (1986).
51. This could be referred as "rule of law." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 925 (6th
ed. 1991) (providing that decisions should be made by the application of known
principles or laws without the intervention of discretion of their application; also
"... sometimes called 'the supremacy of law"'). See also Maximo Bomchil, The
Rule of Law in Argentina: A Pending Issue?, 23 INT'L Bus. LAW 369 (1995) (ex-
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The international law of foreign investment provides that regulations
should not be arbitrary. Instead, they should be for public purpose and
based on existing law, not on the will of the ruler. 52 Nor should regula-
tion be discriminatory among individuals or entities in equal circum-
stances. 53 If the property is seized by the State, the owner should be
compensated, according to a formula of adequate, prompt and effective 54
payment. In the application of this formula of compensation for damages
inflicted, however, it should not be forgotten that legitimate expectations
of the parties as well as all surrounding circumstances of the case should
be taken into account.5 5
B. EXPROPRIATIONS ACCORDING TO THE G3
The G3's stance on expropriation parallels those outlined above.56 Ac-
cordingly, parties are not entitled to expropriate or nationalize directly or
indirectly nor are they permitted to adopt measures equivalent to expro-
priation or nationalization unless it is required by public purpose, on non-
discriminatory bases, in accordance with the principle of legality, and the
owner is compensated. 57
No definition is provided for expropriation or nationalization. Thus, as
in other international investment agreements, a key issue is to determine
whether or not specific State actions constitute expropriation or national-
ization that would require compensation. This issue is particularly impor-
tant in the context of regulatory takings and less with direct
expropriations, which are easily recognizable: a State takes over a busi-
ness or nationalizes an industry depriving the investor of ownership, con-
trol and possession. Regulatory takings are less obvious.
plaining that the concept of "rule of law" comprises two concepts: the constitu-
tional order that separates branches of government and ensures the independence
of the judiciary, and legal security as the stability, certainty, and predictability of
laws and court judgments).
52. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985). See also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 39, at 504 (arguing that
the State has discretion to determine the public purpose. The limit is set, however,
in the sense that such taking cannot be for personal gain nor performed in the
absence of legal recognition. Neither can the taking be in the course of crimes
against the humanity). See also Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New
World Order: Vietnam-A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994).
53. See Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981).
54. This is the Hull formula, named for the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who
exchanged notes on this with the Mexican government during the Mexican expro-
priations that followed the Revolution. See Francesco Francioni, Compensation
for Nationalization of Foreign Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity,
24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 225, 263 (1975).
55. See Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121
(1984).
56. Colombia made reservations to the Expropriation and Compensation article. It
also committed to not apply more restrictive measures in nationalization, expropri-
ation, or compensation issues. Mexico and Venezuela stated that only when Co-
lombia had withdrawn the reservation would they apply the article.
57. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-08.
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Measures equivalent to property seizure include a variety of regulatory
actions that may interfere with an investor's right of property. Creeping
expropriations could also be included therein. Creeping expropriations,
the taking of property by successive and cumulative measures imposed on
a property that eventually lead to the effective negation of the owner's
interest in the property, is another form of property seizure. 58 The fact
that neither expropriation nor equivalent measures are defined leaves the
determination of indirect takings to be resolved.
One issue worth noting in the context of the G3 relates to regulations
and regulatory takings. States are entitled to exercise governmental regu-
latory power that might eventually impact the economic value of the in-
vestment but not to the extent that ownership is deprived. Tax and
environmental measures are examples of regulatory measures that might
impact the individual's right of property.
Property rights cannot be conceived as separate from the interests of
society at large. For that reason the legality and legitimacy of a State's
interference with an individual's rights of property to protect social inter-
ests is not at question. The debate is centered on how to differentiate
legitimate measures to protect social interests from illegitimate regula-
tory takings of property that require compensation. The consensus seems
to be that "[w]here interference with private property rights violates the
legitimate rights or expectations of owners, the State may need to provide
compensation. '59
The G3 does not provide any hints to determine when a regulatory
measure is a taking, nor does NAFFA. However, several Tribunals, some
of which are NAFTA-related, have enlightened the issue. In the Metal-
clad case, the Tribunal held that article 1110 of NAFTA also includes "...
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of the property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State."'60
Similarly, during the Santa Elena case, the ICSID arbitration Tribunal
dealt with the issue of the date of the taking to determine the compensa-
tion payable. The Tribunal noted that a measure taken for the purpose of
environmental protection that gradually deprived owners of the value of
their property was no different from a taking for which full compensation
must be paid.61
Other awards have pointed to an analysis that balances the investor's
property rights and the public good. In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the
Tribunal held that regulatory takings of property might include denying
58. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 2003, supra note 14, at 110.
59. Id. at 112.
60. http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3752.htm Mex., ICSID (W. Bank) ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
16 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 168, 195 $ 103 (2001).
61. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/96/1 (2000), 15 ICSID REV. -
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 169 (2000).
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the right to export with intent to transfer ownership. 62 However, that was
not the case in S.D. Myers.63
In the Feldman case, the Tribunal held that some business problems of
a foreign investor are not expropriations under NAFTA, and such was
the situation in Feldman.64 Similarly, in the Azinian case, the Tribunal
stated that not all governmental interference with a foreign investment
constitutes an expropriation. 65
The Tribunal also found no expropriation in the Pope case. 66 However,
it stated that to determine ". . . whether a particular interference with
business activities amounts to an expropriation, the test is whether that
interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the
property had been 'taken' from the owner."' 67 Likewise, in the Sporrong
case, heard in the European Court of Human Rights, 68 the court stated
that when the substance of the right of property has been affected, there
is a property taking of property for which the State must pay
compensation. 69
In Tecmed v. Mexico,70 the ICSID Tribunal stressed the difference be-
tween direct, creeping, and de facto expropriation. It mentioned that, al-
though creeping and de facto were kinds of indirect expropriation, the
latter referred to conduct or actions that do not state an intent to deprive
rights or assets but in fact have that effect, 7 1 either by "[transferring] as-
sets to third parties different from the expropriating State or . . . without
allocating such assets to third parties or to the Government. ' 72 The Tri-
bunal supported its award with case law and found that there was de facto
expropriation when the deprivation was irreversible and the action or de-
cision destroyed the ability to use, enjoy or dispose of the assets or
rights.73 This is the case even where legal ownership over the assets in
question is not affected, provided the deprivation is not permanent.7 4 It
then concluded that regulatory actions and measures would not be ex-
cluded from the definition of expropriation if they are excessive in pro-
portion to the public interest being protected. 75 Accordingly, "there must
be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or
weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized
62. Id.
63. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., 40 I.L.M. 625 288 (2000).
64. Feldman v. Mex., 42 I.L.M. 625 112 (2002).
65. Azinian v. Mex., 39 LL.M. 537 83 (1999).
66. Id.
67. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can., Interim Award $ 102 (Jun. 26, 2000), available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopelnterimMeritsAward.pdf.
68. Sporrong & Lonnroth v. Swed., 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 35 (1982).
69. Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in In-
ternational Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURs 259, 330-331 (1982).
70. Tecmed v. Mex., 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004).
71. Id. 114.
72. Id. 113.
73. Id. $ 116.
74. Id.
75. Id. T 122.
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by any expropriatory measure. '76
In sum, the principles set by those decisions can be useful for the inter-
pretation of the G3 and in determining the extent to which the regulatory
authority of the States can be exercised without giving grounds to com-
pensation. In that context, the authority of the States to regulate their
economies remains intact, but if the regulation interferes with the right of
property in a way that leaves it useless for the owner, then a regulatory
taking has occurred and compensation should be paid. Such judgments
should be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the key is that if the sub-
stance of the right is affected so that the owner of an asset no longer has
the right to dispose, use, control, or profit from it, deprivation of property
may have occurred through creeping expropriation, de facto expropria-
tion or constructive taking. 77
Additionally, as a matter of sovereignty, the G3 States are entitled to
take punitive measures on behalf of the public interest. In such cases,
property is taken as part of a sanction imposed on the owner due to a
violation of regulations. Typically punitive measures are applied only if
criminal regulations are broken.78 In such cases, no compensation is re-
quired and property is confiscated as part of a sanction imposed on the
owner following a regulatory violation. 79
For a property taking to be considered legal, according to the G3
Agreement, certain conditions need to be met. First, the taking should be
based on grounds of public utility,80 presumably public use. 81 Though no
definition of the public utility concept is provided, it could be likened to
the concept of public interest, which is widely known in international
law.82 Public interest is generally understood as something less than na-
tional interest8 3 but different from the personal interest of governmental
officers. 84
The determination of what is and what is not public interest is some-
thing over which States have discretion.8 5 Though during any taking of
property a portion of the public will always benefit directly, the principle
of government seizure for public use requires that something more signif-
icant be provided to the public.8 6 Furthermore, the G3 requires that a
taking be non-discriminatory, which is to say that the taking of property
in one set of circumstances should be applied to all parties in analogous
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Higgins, supra note 69.
79. See id.
80. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art 17-08
81. See Higgins, supra note 69, at 288, 331.
82. Id.
83. It is much more related to strategic political-military purposes of a country vis-A-
vis foreign countries.
84. Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam-A Case
Study, supra note 52.
85. Id.
86. See Higgins, supra note 69.
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circumstances. 87
The G3 also requires that property takings be applied in accordance
with the principle of legality, meaning that takings should not be arbitrary
or based on caprice. 88 Likewise, legal actions to challenge them should
also be provided.89
Lastly, compensation should be paid. The G3 uses the Hull formula of
adequate, prompt and effective payment, though it goes deeper in some
regards.90 Accordingly, payment should be equivalent to the fair market
value at the moment of the expropriation. 91 Moreover, the agreement
provides that compensation should not reflect any change in economic
value due to knowledge of the intention to expropriate obtained before
the date thereof.92 In order to comply with that part of the provision, a
tribunal analyzing this issue would probably need to look at the facts and
determine the date of expropriation not as per the official date but rather
on the date when the intention to expropriate became known.
Valuation shall include the value of tangible assets as expressed in the
tax returns as well as other appropriate criteria useful in determining the
fair market value.93 Compensation should be paid in cash or by other
fully-liquid means, as payment in bonds or any other conditional instru-
ment will not be accepted.94 Compensation should also be made in a
freely convertible currency and transferred in accordance with the provi-
sions of the agreement.95
The agreement also states that payment should be made in a timely
manner to protect the investor against currency fluctuations.96 Accord-
ingly, if a period of time lapses between the moment the amount of com-
pensation is fixed and the actual payment, the investor is entitled to
receive a sum equal to the fixed amount as denominated in the hard cur-
rency most used by the property-taking State. Likewise, the payment
should include interest at the market rate of the currency of reference. 97
Parties should also allow money transfers related to investments of an-
other G3 Party to be made feely and without delay in convertible cur-
rency at the market exchange rate.98 The provision includes, inter alia,
transfers of profits, dividends, interests, capital gains, royalties, payments
from sales, payments of expropriation compensation, and payments made
as a consequence of dispute settlements.99
87. M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 175 (1986).
88. Id.
89. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. ITALY), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 109 (July 20).
90. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-08.
91. Id.
92. Id. at art. 17-08(2).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at art. 17-08(3).
96. Id.
97. Id. at art. 17-08(4).
98. Id.
99. Id. at art. 17-07.
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However, the parties to the G3 can suspend unilateral money transfers
for a period of time, provided that the suspension is based on expressly
stated reasons, such as a serious difficulty with the balance of pay-
ments.' 0 0 The G3 Agreement makes no indication of a limit on the time
extension during which a party can suspend money transfers.
V. INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS
A. INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS ACCORDING TO THE
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
When investment disputes arise, the directly interested parties are the
investor and the host country, though the home country might also have
an interest. However, it is the investor, rather than the home country
who would absorb the loss if any were to occur. Thus, the investor seeks
to have control of the dispute, as the home government might include
arguments that are contrary to the investor's interest. For example, the
weight of other claims in negotiations between States could diminish the
importance of a single investor's claim. Likewise, political factors could
interfere with a conflict that otherwise would be purely economic. 0 1 On
the other hand, the home country's political strength might be a decisive
factor in pressing the host State to settle the investment dispute on terms
more favorable to the investor.
In this context, it is important to determine who would have the stand-
ing10 2 to claim satisfaction to the host country for the damages inflicted
on the investing corporation. If one takes for granted the narrow view of
the law, according to which a transnational corporate investor is a group
of legal entities created all around the world,'0 3 then, at the moment a
conflict arises, the local corporation whose shares are owned by a foreign
100. Id. at art. 17-07(3), (6).
101. See Bruce Kogut, Foreign Direct Investment as a Sequential Process, in 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIRECr FOREIGN INVESTMENT 273 (Benjamin
Gomes-Casseres & David Yoffie eds., 1993).
102. "'Standing to sue' means that party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy ... The requirement
of 'standing' is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible
and tangible interest at stake in the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra
note 37, at 978.
103. Id. See also Peter Hansen &Victoria Aranda, An Emerging International Frame-
work for Transnational Corporations, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 881 (1990).
"[T]ransnational corporation[s] as a group of enterprises with a unified structure
and with common control and strategy has yet to find a legal regime that matches
those characteristics. From the legal perspective, a transnational corporation is
only recognized as a group of separate national companies established under the
laws of different countries... [i]t is difficult or impossible to hold the entire enter-
prise accountable for its actions." Id. at 882. See also Raymond Vernon, Codes on
Transnationals: Ingredients for an Effective International Regime, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 227 ( A.A.
Fatouros ed., 1994) (arguing that if TNCs are composed of a number of separate
enterprises, each unit would respond to the obligations imposed by the sovereign
State, but if they are affiliates linked by strong bonds and responding to common
strategies, governments would have to figure out how to extract bcncfits from such
a system, thereby causing conflict. In some cases governments do not accept that
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legal entity would not have grounds for an international legal claim
against the host country.
The International Court of Justice used this principle in the Barcelona
Traction case, when it stated that international law recognizes the exis-
tence of the corporate entity as a matter of domestic law brought about
by economic realities.10 4 Accordingly, in that case, a company incorpo-
rated in Canada, whose shares were owned by Belgians, could not be
protected by Belgium before the court.10 5 The court's rationale was that,
under customary international law, a corporation can only claim the pro-
tection of the country where it was incorporated but not the protection of
the shareholder's country. 10 6
Using this interpretation of the facts, shareholders and corporations
are different entities with different personalities and rights. Accordingly,
the corporation has a property right over assets it owns and the right to
diplomatic protection by the country of its incorporation.10 7 The share-
holders, on the other hand, have a property right to the shares and the
right to diplomatic protection by the country of their nationality.10 8
Certainly, the difference of legal personalities has been overcome
through most BITs by providing that local corporations in which foreign-
ers have a substantial interest, this being substantial share of ownership
and ability to exercise decisive influence,1 0 9 could have standing to claim
international protection. But where there is no treaty providing so, the
subsidiary of a foreign corporation is still considered a local entity.
Therefore, in absence of any treaty, the host countries could state that a
legal entity created under their laws is a national investor regardless of
who owns the shares and consequently entitled only to have access to
domestic investment dispute settlement mechanisms.1 10
Thus, if the term investor is defined in a way that includes more than
just the subsidiary, the investor might consider itself protected. In the
absence of treaty protection, the investor would only have standing for a
the parent corporation has to assume the subsidiary's foreign liability, but they ask
subsidiaries to comply with the parent's country law provisions).




108. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
3442 (1995) (discussing how BITs have solved this issue); See also E.R. HARDY
IVAMY, DICrIONARY OF COMPANY LAW 42 (2d. ed., 1985) (arguing that the corpo-
rate personality does not have anything to do with the personality of its members,
thus, the corporation and its liabilities are distinct from the shareholder and its
shares) (on file with author).
109. See UNITED NATIONS CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, supra note 24. See also VANDEVELDE, supra note 25. See
also Paul Bryan Christy III, Negotiating Investment in the GATT: A Call for Func-
tionalism, 12 MIcH J. INT'L L. 743 (1991) (explaining US BIT model is broad in
regards to investment definition and the US Department of State defines control
on 10% shares ownership).
110. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 3. See also, IoNAZ SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATION IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (1987).
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claim against the country when it operates therein through a branch, be-
cause, according to local laws, the branch does not, in itself, have a legal
personality separate from its parent. Thus, any liability arising from its
activities would make the latter liable with no need to pierce the corpo-
rate veil.1 1
Besides investors' interests, it is important that this issue be defined for
the well-being of the State. If the investors can take actions against host
countries for wrongdoing, the States should be allowed to take similar
actions against the investors. However, if the country's view is that each
subsidiary is a different legal entity, it would be difficult to claim satisfac-
tion to the parent company or other members of the group. For example,
if the host country seeks payment of damages from the investor and the
investor's assets are worth less than the amount claimed, the country
would be at risk of not obtaining satisfaction for that claim. The lift-of-
corporate-veil doctrine that has been accepted by some countries may not
be helpful, as applicability of the doctrine generally requires intention of
fraud to bona fide parties plus acceptance of enforcement by the country
where the parent company is located.' 12
In sum, host countries might also be interested in the term investor
being defined in broad terms, so as to include not only the local legal
entity, but also the parent company, and even the whole economic
group. 1 3 In so doing, the legal reality would be closer to the economic
reality. The transnational corporation investor would not be viewed as a
group of separate legal entities but as one centrally-controlled economic
entity of organization of production factors with units scattered in differ-
ent countries, 11 4 for which all and each unit is responsible for the others'
activities.
1ll. See Vernon, supra note 103.
112. See SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 110, at 5. "[Tlhe very essence of the no-
tion of corporation is respect for the existence of the corporate veil, separating the
corporation from its members and endowing it with rights and duties to its own.
Yet even the general principles of domestic law admit that this veil may be lifted
under certain exceptional circumstances . . . . This follows from the elementary
principle of justice that requires reference to the substance and not merely to the
legal form." Id.
113. UNCTAD DIVISION ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INVESTMENT,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1993: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTE-
GRATED INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION at 190, U.N.Doc ST/CTC1156, U.N. Sales
No. E.93.I1.A.14 (1993) (explaining that the nationality of corporations is relevant
in order to determine the law that is to be applicable and the State that would
exert diplomatic protection on their behalf. However, this approach is becoming
less meaningful. The concept of a separate legal corporate personality does not
accurately reflect the reality of functional ties between affiliates as a business
group and can hinder the attribution of responsibility among them. With the inte-
gration of production activities the affiliate may lose autonomy in management
and operational aspects. Thus the concept of parent responsibility vs. group re-
sponsibility should be studied).
114. Id. See also Hansen and Aranda, supra note 103.
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B. INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS ACCORDING TO THE G3
The G3, provides dispute settlement mechanisms for investors and
States. Disputes between investors can be of different natures. If dis-
putes are investment-related they fall under chapter seventeen. How-
ever, because the G3 is a comprehensive trade agreement, it is presumed
that disputes arising out of an agreement-related matter other than in-
vestment could be submitted to arbitration. If that is the case, the dispute
could not be submitted to ICSID, and chapter seventeen would not
govern. 115
Some disputes are excluded from the G3, even if they are investment-
related. For example, disputes that arise out of national security mea-
sures, public order or criminal law provisions, or when a party prohibits
or restricts the acquisition of an investment in its territory by an investor
of any other party are not included in the G3 agreements. 116
If the dispute falls under the G3, an investor from the other party or on
behalf of an enterprise of its property or under its effective control can
submit a dispute to arbitration. However, local enterprises in which a
foreign investor from the other G3 party has made an investment cannot
submit a dispute to arbitration under the terms of the agreement. In
other words, locally incorporated corporations cannot initiate arbitration;
the foreign controlling investor from a G3 party will have the standing." 17
The G3 Agreement requires that a dispute be based on a violation of
the obligations established therein and that the investor had been dam-
aged or had suffered a loss as a consequence of that violation." 18 Thus,
the mere violation of the G3 Agreement is not sufficient to submit a dis-
pute. The G3 does not provide for any reference as to the nature of the
damage or loss. However, awards issued in the context of G3 investment
disputes can only provide compensation for damages or losses plus inter-
ests if applicable. From that provision, it can be concluded that damages
or losses that give rise to a G3 investment claim need to be of economic
nature.
In this sense, property takings under the G3 are unlikely to be compen-
sated as per the standard restitutio in integrum. The investor whose prop-
erty is taken would not be restored to the position he was before the
expropriation. The agreement provides that the award could contem-
plate restitution of the property, but the same provision states that the
Party could pay in equivalent. 1 9 Thus, a State party can choose between
paying in equivalent or restitution of property, if the latter has been im-
posed in the award. A State is most likely to pay in equivalent.
In general, restitutio in integrum is considered interference with a
State's sovereignty that might cancel the effects of an expropriation, al-
115. ICSID Convention, supra note 23, at art. 25.
116. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-24.
117. Id. at art. 17-17 (2).
118. Id. at art. 17-17(1).
119. Id. at art. 17-21(1).
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though it was recognized as a possible remedy in the AMCO case.'
2 0
However, that does not mean that the owner should not be compensated.
This has led some authors to suggest that in those circumstances mea-
sures of reprisal by the home State would not be illegal if the home
State's investor did not succeed in obtaining restitution.' 2 ' Likewise, the
Permanent Court of International Justice had accepted the principle resti-
tutio in integrum for illicit acts.12 2
If the State decides to pay in equivalent, it should compensate for the
damnus emergens, that is, the loss sustained. 123 A different matter is the
inclusion of lucrum cessans, that is, the lost profits. In some cases, it has
been granted as an equitable remedy, as in the Sapphire arbitration
where the Tribunal held that there was a premature termination of a con-
cession agreement. 1 24
The G3 is silent with respect to lucrum cessans. It only states that the
award should provide coverage for pecuniary damages and interests. An
argument can be made to consider lost profits as a pecuniary damage.
Thus, the determination and inclusion of lost profits is not excluded and
could be considered by tribunals.
There is a statue of limitation of three years to submit the investment
dispute to arbitration, beginning on the date when the investor had
knowledge or should have had knowledge of the presumed violation of
the agreement and the damages. The G3 Agreement does not provide
any hint as to how to determine the knowledge of violation of the agree-
ment and of damages. This key issue should be determined on a factual
basis.
The G3 agreement contains a "fork in the road" provision according to
which the violation of the agreement can only be submitted to either a
local court or an arbitration tribunal. If it has been submitted to a local
court, the same dispute could not be submitted to arbitration and vice
versa. The rationale of a recent ICSID case could be extended to G3
cases where the "fork in the road" provision arises. In CMS, 12 5 Argen-
tina objected to ICSID jurisdiction because TGN, the company where
CMS was a minority shareholder, appealed a judicial decision and sought
other administrative remedies, for which, it was argued, CMS could not
submit the same dispute to arbitration.
The Tribunal pointed out that contractual claims are different from
treaty claims. Treaty claims can be submitted to arbitration while con-
tractual claims are submitted to local courts. If a claimant renounces the
right to arbitrate a treaty dispute by submitting that dispute to local
courts, then the "fork in the road" rule would have been triggered so long
120. AMCO, 23 I.L.M. 351.
121. B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959).
122. Chorzow Factory Case (F.G.R. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser A) No. 17, at 28 (Sept.
13).
123. LIAMCO, 20 I.L.M. 1.
124. Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963).
125. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., 42 I.L.M. 788 (2003).
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as it was provided by in the relevant treaty. In that event, the selection
would have been binding. The Tribunal found that none of those were
the circumstances of CMS because it had not filed a treaty claim in local
courts.
Regarding the specific procedural steps, the G3 requires that the inves-
tor submit a communication to the State expressing the intention to sub-
mit the investment dispute to arbitration. If ninety days have passed
since the communication has been submitted and six months since the
challenged measures were taken, the investor can submit the dispute to
ICSID arbitration, arbitration as per the additional facility of ICSID, if
either the State party to the dispute or the State of nationality of the
investor are not party to the ICSID Convention, and arbitration accord-
ing to the rules of UNCITRAL. 126
The parties to the G3 Agreement expressly consented to arbitration.
But that in and of itself would not be sufficient-for arbitration tribunals to
have jurisdiction. The investor party to the dispute needs to grant con-
sent as well. Consent can be granted explicitly by the investor or implic-
itly by filing a claim. Several ICSID cases have dealt with the issue of
consent by the investor.
In SPP v. Egypt127 the Tribunal held that acceptance of the State's of-
fer to arbitrate the dispute before ICSID made by a local law could be
accepted expressly by the investor in a letter where he indicated his ac-
ceptance or by filing the claim with ICSID. The same rationale can be
extended to offers to arbitrate made in multilateral agreements, as is the
case with the G3.
In AMT v. Zaire,128 the Tribunal dealt with the acceptance of an offer
to arbitrate at ICSID, but the offer had been made by a State in a BIT.
The Tribunal stated "AMT has expressed its choice without any equivo-
cation; this willingness together with that of Zaire expressed in the
Treaty, creates that consent necessary to validate the assumption of juris-
diction by the Centre."' 129
The investment dispute settlement mechanism provisions of the G3
provide for the possibility of claims consolidation. However, in that case
all disputes should be handled in accordance with UNCITRAL. 130
Parties to the dispute can submit any sort of legal defenses and argu-
ments based on the facts and the law, including jurisdiction objections to
the arbitral tribunals. However, a State party cannot allege as defense
that the investor was insured against the damage for which the claim has
been submitted.1 31
126. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-18 (2).
127. SPP v. Egypt, 3 ICSID REP. 102, 119 (1985).
128. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1546 (1997).
129. Id.
130. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17-19 (1).
131. Id. at art. 17-22.
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As for legal arguments, they should be related to the G3 and applicable
rules of international law, as those will be the applicable law for deciding
the merits of the dispute. 32 However, if the issue is jurisdiction and the
dispute falls under ICSID, the ICSID Convention could be the applicable
law.
In CMS, 133 Argentina argued that the jurisdiction of ICSID should be
decided according to its own law. The Tribunal said that the provisions of
article forty-two of the Convention are applicable to the resolution of the
disputes on the merits. It pointed out that the issues of jurisdiction are
governed by article twenty-five of the Convention and other provisions of
the consent instrument that might be applicable.
The awards are final and subject to enforcement. If a State fails to
comply with the arbitral award the investor can ask for diplomatic protec-
tion from the State of its nationality who could submit the dispute to
arbitration under the State-State dispute settlement mechanism. 134 If a
G3 party considers that an award has not been followed, it also can sub-
mit a dispute to the State-State dispute settlement mechanism, regardless
of whether the investor has claimed diplomatic protection. 135
However, resorting to diplomatic protection is only possible once the
arbitral award has been issued. In other words, arbitration and diplo-
matic protection could not be asked for at the same time. In that regard,
it is worthwhile stressing what an ISCID arbitral Tribunal held: "... . once
ICSID arbitration is available for settling a dispute related to a foreign
private investment, diplomatic protection is excluded: the investor no
longer has the right to seek diplomatic protection, and the investor's
home State no longer has the right to grant the investor diplomatic
protection."' 136
One recent ICSID case could have given the opportunity to an ICSID
additional facility Tribunal to bring a case under the G3.137 In the
AUCOVEN case, a Mexican company owned the majority of the shares
of a Venezuelan company incorporated in order to operate a highway
concession granted by the Government of Venezuela. The local company
filed a claim alleging breach of the concession agreement. The Mexican
shareholding company sold its shares to an American company. The con-
cession agreement had specific provisions related to investment dispute.
One of those related to foreign control whereby the local company was
considered a national of another country and consequently entitled to
initiate international arbitration as it was controlled by a foreigner. The
132. Id. at art. 17-20.
133. CMS, 42 I.L.M. 788.
134. G3 Agreement, supra note 1, at ch. 19.
135. Id. at art. 17-23.
136. Banro Am. Res., Inc. v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/98/7 (2000), 17
ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 382, at 387 (2002).
137. Mexico is not a party to the ICSID Convention, thus the additional facility rules
would have applied.
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dispute was heard by an ICSID arbitration Tribunal and considered the
investor to be an American investor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The G3 has improved the investment climate of the three member
countries. In times when investments do not only flow from developed
countries, but also between developing countries, a modern reliable inter-
national legal framework for foreign investment between developing
countries can help increase the flow of foreign investment from south to
south. The G3 has done that.
The G3 Agreement covers the most important issues of FI in line with
the emerging international law of foreign investment. It extends protec-
tion to different sorts of F1, not only FDI. It protects investors from
member countries, even when they do business through a locally incorpo-
rated entity. It also guarantees national treatment and MFN treatment to
investors and investments. Likewise, the agreement prohibits direct and
indirect takings of property and equivalent measures. Due to the social
function of the right of property, property takings by the State, including
regulatory takings of property, are allowed so long as customary interna-
tional law conditions provided by the G3 are followed.
The G3 Agreement provides for investor-State investment dispute
mechanisms in the same way that most BITs and NAFTA do. It also
contains the consent of the States for submitting a dispute to a tribunal
chosen as per those provisions.
However, the G3 lacks a provision for admission. States maintain their
sovereignty regarding the entry of the investment. If economies are not
liberalized to allow entry of foreign entities, the legal protection granted
to investments and investors of other parties proves futile.
One mechanism that could have been used to guarantee liberalization
of the economies was the requirement to meet minimum standards of
economic liberalization, along with the possibility of a list of closed areas
or sectors exempted at the investment entry stage. For example, the G3
could have compelled States to deregulate areas of the economy, priva-
tize State-owned corporations and reduce public expenditure as a prereq-
uisite to enter into the agreement.
Regardless of the G3 imposing those obligations, parties might volun-
tarily liberalize their economies. That would increase the investment op-
portunities for foreign and local investors. Local investors would benefit
from the interaction and competition with foreign investors. This could
help local investors take the quantum leap of exploring foreign markets.
The framework provided by the G3 has granted investors from each of
the parties the same standards they would find in developed countries'
economies. However this has not been sufficient to increase the flow of
FI between the parties. Countries need to open more space in their econ-
omies to allow investors to capitalize on the advantages provided by the
G3 agreement; only then can a final judgment of the G3 be issued.
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